LIBRARY
SUPREME COURT. U. S.

No. ~~[illegible]~~ 115

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUN 19 1958
JOHN T. FEY, Clerk

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1958

EMANUEL RIGGI,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

ANTHONY A. CALANDRA,
Attorney for Petitioner,
Emanuel Riggi,
11 Commerce Street,
Newark 2, New Jersey.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Question Presented	2
Statute Involved	2
Statement	2
Reasons for Granting the Writ	6
Conclusion	11
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit	12

Cases Cited.

Boyett v. *United States*, 48 F. 2d 482 (C. A. 5, 1931)	9
Turcott v. *United States*, 21 F. 2d 829 (C. A. 7, 1927)	9
United States v. *Harrison*, 121 F. 2d 930 (C. A. 3, 1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 661, 62 Sup. Ct. 124 (1941)	9
United States v. *Falcone*, 109 F. 2d 579 (C. A. 2, 1940), aff'd 311 U. S. 205, 61 Sup. Ct. 204 (1940).	10
United States v. *O'Brien*, 174 F. 2d 341 (C. A. 7, 1949)	7, 11

Statutes Cited.

18 U. S. C. § 1951	1

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1957.

EMANUEL RIGGI,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the United States:

Petitioner, Emanuel Riggi, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered in the above-entitled case on May 27th, 1958, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Title 18 U. S. C. Section 1951.

Opinions Below.

The District Court did not file an opinion. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, printed infra, (Appendix to this Petition, page 12), has not yet been officially reported.

Jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on May 27th, 1958. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 28 U. S. C. Section 1254 (1).

Question Presented.

1. Whether a defendant in a criminal case is denied a fair trial when the trial court fails to instruct the jury concerning the nature of the defense.

Statute Involved.

The petitioner was indicted, convicted and sentenced under the Hobbs Act, Title 18 U. S. C. Section 1951. The question presented in this Petition does not involve the statute.

Statement.

Chemsteel Construction Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, contracted with American Cyanamid Corporation of Linden, New Jersey, to build there a brick acid concentration tank (21a, 84a, 121a).

Harry Smith, a Chemsteel superintendent, following his customary procedure went to the bricklayer's union hall to check in with the business agent of the bricklayer's union whose job it was to place bricklayers on jobs according to the contractor's request (20a, 21a, 88a, 196a, 236a, 247a). The bricklayer's business agent was a co-defendant, Albert Doyle, who did not appeal his conviction.

Doyle approved Smith's request to use on the job Chemsteel workers as well as local bricklayers (26a, 237a). According to Smith, Doyle told him: "He said he had a boat and some other heavy expenses, and he wasn't just a business agent in there for his health; he was in there for money * * * He said he'd like to have one bricklayer on his payroll that didn't work * * * to insure peaceful workmanship or peaceful relationship * * *" (27a, 28a). Smith told Doyle he thought it could be arranged (28a).

Doyle asked Smith if he checked in with Riggi, who was the business agent of the hodcarrier's (laborers) local union (28a). The bricklayers cannot work without the laborers on any construction job (238a, 273a). When there is a construction job requiring bricklaying, the procedure is that Doyle and the superintendent on the job appear at Riggi's office or contact him (274a, 279a). And Chemsteel's superintendent customarily saw the laborers' business agent to get straightened out with him before starting a job (29a, 30a). Chemsteel had jobs in the Elizabeth area every year beginning in 1952 (162a).

Smith testified that when he arrived at Riggi's office, Doyle beckoned to him from an upstairs window (30a). Smith went upstairs, Doyle told him to wait outside Riggi's office (30a). Doyle and Riggi went into Riggi's office, they closed the door and in about twenty minutes Doyle asked Smith to come into the office (31a). Doyle, Riggi and Smith conferred in Riggi's office (31a to 36a). Smith explained to Riggi that he needed local laborers and he wanted to bring in Chemsteel men (31a). Riggi said probably it could be arranged (32a). Doyle said Riggi wanted

the same set-up for an extra non-working bricklayer (32a). Smith said it could not be arranged through him because he had no authority to do it (32a). Doyle said the other bricklayer should be on Riggi's payroll to insure a smooth job (33a). Smith asked Riggi to phone Merrill Stewart, Smith's superior in Pittsburgh (33a, 34a). Riggi refused (34a). When Doyle said nonworking bricklayers were to be added to Chemsteel's payroll, Smith asked Riggi for the name and Social Security number of a laborer (36a). Riggi did not do it (36a). Riggi told Smith that if he wanted to be sure of labor relations on the job, Smith better call Stewart and have him come to Elizabeth because he did not want to talk to him if he was not the man who could settle it (37a).

After Doyle and Smith left Riggi's office, Doyle told Smith he would furnish the names and Social Security numbers of the brick laborers (38a). Doyle suggested to Smith that there would be a good acid brick foreman available in about four days (249a). Doyle was thinking about Murphy (39a, 249a), who was working on another job (198a), but who previously had worked as a foreman (205a, 249a).

Several days later Smith phoned Stewart and told him there was a demand to put two non-working men on the payroll, one man for each business agent (41a, 123a, 129a). Smith told Stewart the purpose was to insure labor relationships and to allow Chemsteel to use its own men (41a). All that Stewart said was that it was too big a job for Smith to handle so he would send another superintendent to replace him (43a).

Smith began working on the job. In several days Stewart and the substitute superintendent, Brown arrived on the job (38a, 43a, 44a, 87a, 133a, 159a).

Chemsteel had made it a habit in all its years in the construction business to go to the local union authorities to get their local rules to follow (154a). Stewart, Brown and Doyle met (135a, 173a, 242a). Stewart remarked that Chemsteel had been doing financially successful work in the area since 1950 and he wanted to meet the business agents from whom he got the bricklayers (242a). Stewart testified that Doyle said " 'You understand that you are to put on two men * * * I'm to get half of it and the laborer business agent is to get the other half' " (137a, 138a). Doyle named Riggi as the laborer business agent (138a). When Stewart raised problems about Social Security and an auditor, Doyle told him to make Murphy foreman, give him the money and they would give Stewart the records (138a). Doyle said that if Chemsteel would go along on those bases, there would not be any trouble on the job (139a). Stewart agreed to go along (149a). RIGGI WAS NOT PRESENT AT THESE CONVERSATIONS.

Later that day Stewart, Brown, Doyle and Riggi ate lunch together. As to the conversations at the luncheon table, Brown recalled nothing (175a), Doyle testified about the congeniality and that nothing special was said (168a, 244a). Only Stewart testified that anything was said about the Cyanamid job: "He [Riggi] looked over to me during the conversation and said, 'Are you all straight with Doyle?' I said, 'Yes.' He said, 'Well, that's fine. You can bring in anyone you care to.' " (143a). The trial court's opinion of Stewart's testimony on this point was that the inference from Riggi's statement is "equally innocent" (Tr. 338).

Murphy started to work on the job (198a). About one week later, Doyle gave him the names Sal Vencola and

Stanley Pudvesky to give to Stewart (199a). Doyle said the two men would be on the payroll (199a). Murphy gave the two names to Smith (200a). Vencola and Pudvesky never were members of the bricklayer's local union in 1956 (164a), Murphy did not know them (199a), Smith never met them (50a), Brown did not know them (179a), and they never worked or were seen on the job (50a).

Every Friday, Brown gave Murphy two pay envelopes and Murphy signed the names Vencola and Pudvesky (51a, 52a, 183a, 200a). Doyle sometimes signed the two names (201a, *et seq.*).

On Friday nights Murphy gave the two pay envelopes to Doyle (204a). Once Murphy accumulated six envelopes while Doyle was in Seattle (205a, 212a). Doyle told him he kept one envelope and the other was going to Riggi (205a).

Riggi denied attempting to extort money from Chemsteel, or conspiring with Doyle and Murphy, or receiving money (278a).

Reasons for Granting Writ.

While the government's case against Riggi was based upon his presence during discussions between Doyle and Smith and his knowledge of Doyle's scheme to extort, the theory of Riggi's defense was that if he were present during some of the discussions, he neither participated in Doyle's scheme nor consented to it. This theory was supported by uncontradicted testimony that bricklayers cannot work without the laborers on any construction job and, "on a lot" of occasions, disputes on a job required Riggi and Doyle to go to the job site together and settle them

(280a). On or about September 4, 1956 after Doyle demanded that Smith approve the scheme, they went to Riggi's office. This was the Smith-Riggi meeting upon which the government based its case. There was a sharp and hotly contested issue, first about whether the three men met and conferred together, and second about what was said. Both Riggi and Doyle testified they met to settle a jurisdictional dispute that had arisen on a job (238a, 239a, 276a, 279a, 280a). The government's evidence tended to show they met and conferred to extort money from Chemsteel (30a, *et seq.*).

Thus, while there was uncontradicted testimony that Riggi and Doyle were together "a lot" because of the nature of their jobs, there was conflicting testimony about whether their jobs or conspiracy brought them together on or about September 4, 1956. Both men admitted they met at that time. If Riggi were associating with a guilty man, he was entitled to have the jury instructed that that fact was not evidence he was guilty of a Hobbs Act crime. *United States* v. *O'Brien*, 174 F. 2d 341, 345 (C. A. 7 1949). The instructions he requested would have informed the jury that such a meeting, as well as others, was not proof of guilt without other evidence. Since the court refused the requests, the jury was allowed to infer from a meeting that admittedly occurred, that Doyle and Riggi met to conspire.

It was in this context that Riggi requested the trial court to instruct the jury as follows:

> "18. If you find from all of the evidence that Emanuel Riggi had knowledge that Doyle and Murphy had entered into an understanding or agreement with the executives and employees of Chemsteel

Corporation, this knowledge would not be sufficient to make him a conspirator. Knowledge of payments in reference to the fictitious bricklayers in and of itself is not sufficient to make him an aider and abettor or co-conspirator of Doyle and Murphy. Before you may find Emanuel Riggi guilty it is essential that you be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Emanuel Riggi, in addition to the knowledge of the alleged arrangement, acted upon it and promoted the venture himself, make it his own and have a stake in its outcome. If you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt these factors, then Emanuel Riggi is not a conspirator, nor is he an aider and abettor in the conduct of Doyle and Murphy, and it is your duty, therefore, to find Emanuel Riggi not guilty. (U. S. *vs.* Falcone, 109 Fed. (2d) 579, Affirmed 311 U. S. 143).

"19. There is evidence before you that a bricklayer requires, as part of his work, the aid and assistance of a common laborer. There is evidence before you that Doyle is the business agent of a Bricklayer's Union. There is likewise evidence before you that Emanuel Riggi is the business agent of what is commonly referred to as the Laborers' Union. The mere fact that Doyle and Riggi associated together, without more, is not evidence that their association was for a guilty purpose. You have no right to suspect that the mere conversation had between Doyle and Riggi were in and of themselves concerned for any illegal purpose. Their association and conversation, without more, is not proof of guilt. Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere meetings (U. S. *v.* Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 593)" (323a, 324a).

The court refused the requests (315a) and the instructions regarding the general nature of a conspiracy did not substantially include the requests (302a, 311a).

The Court of Appeals approval of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury about Riggi's defense conflicts with its own decision in *United States* vs. *Harrison*, 124 F. 2d 930 (C. A. 3, 1941), cert. denied 314 U. S. 661, 62 Sup. Ct. 124 (1941). There the Court of Appeals held that to make a person a co-conspirator there must be evidence of "an intention to become a party to an illegal enterprise * * * predicated on some affirmative action" (at page 933).

The Court of Appeals' decision below also conflicts with at least two other Courts' of Appeals decisions. In *Turcott* vs. *United States*, 21 F. 2d 829 (C. A. 7, 1927), the court held "The law is well settled that active participation must be established; mere knowledge of the illegal acts of others is not sufficient". And in *Boyett* vs. *United States*, 48 F. 2d 482 (C. A. 5, 1931), the court held "* * * [m]ere knowledge that an offense is being committed is not equivalent to participation with criminal intent. Consent is a necessary element and must also be shown. While this may be inferred from all the circumstances disclosed, it is always a question for the jury * * *".

The refusal of the court to instruct the jury as Riggi requested or to do it substantially in other portions of the instructions denied Riggi a fair trial. While it is not certain the jury found him guilty only from the evidence of his association with Doyle, or from his presence during Doyle's discussions with Smith, or from his knowledge of Doyle's scheme, nevertheless if the court had instructed the jury as Riggi properly requested, it would have eliminated the risk of even the likelihood that his conviction would be based solely on that insufficient evidence.

Since there was testimony that Riggi was present at the Doyle-Smith and other conferences, the government was entitled to an instruction that evidence of presence, knowledge and association were facts for the jury to consider. But Riggi was entitled to instructions that those facts alone were insufficient evidence of guilt. Unless the jury had been properly instructed, it might have inferred from those facts that Riggi participated in the crime. The law does not permit such an inference; courts do not permit convictions based on guilt by association. *United States* v. *Falcone*, 109 F. 2d 579 (C. A. 2 1940), aff'd 311 U. S. 205, 61 Sup. Ct. 204 (1940), was a case in which Judge Learned Hand emphatically stated that association is not of itself sufficient evidence to convict. He warned of the need for precautions or association alone would result in convictions of innocent persons:

> "* * * [I]n prosecutions for conspiracy or abetting his [the defendant's] attitude towards the forbidden undertaking must be more positive. It is not enough that he does not forego a normally lawful activity, of the fruits of which he knows that others will make an unlawful use; he must in some sense promote their venture himself, make it his own, have a stake in its outcome. The distinction is especially important today when *so many prosecutors seek to sweep within the drag-net of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main offenders.* That there are opportunities of great oppression in such a doctrine is very plain, and it is only by circumscribing the scope of such all comprehensive indictments that they can be avoided." (At page 581.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, the indictment against Riggi should have been circumscribed by the court's instructing the jury as he re-

quested. This would have prevented the improper conviction such as the one occurring in *United States* v. *O'Brien*, 174 F. 2d 341 (C. A. 7 1949). In reversing the conviction of O'Brien who had been convicted along with Keating, the court held:

> "* * * There may be a suspicion that O'Brien and Keating had the same interest in this truck for the occasion and in the stolen butter that was found in the truck, but it is only a suspicion and not enough to send O'Brien to the penitentiary. United States *v.* Waimen, 7th Cir., 170 F. 2d 603. If Keating is guilty, the most that can be said of O'Brien is that he was associating with a guilty man. * * *"

Conclusion.

The petitioner was denied a fair trial as a result of the decision below approving the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury about the nature of his defense. Sufficient evidence was adduced by the defendant to compel the substance of the instructions requested by petitioner. The learned Third Circuit's decision at bar conflicts with its own prior decision and those of the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.

The requested instructions embodied the facts and evidence as well as the principles of law directly applicable, and the denial of these instructions to petitioner was highly prejudicial to his right of a fair trial.

Petitioner, therefore, prays that a writ of certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ANTHONY A. CALANDRA,
Attorney for Petitioner,
11 Commerce Street,
Newark 2, New Jersey.

APPENDIX TO PETITION.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 12,508

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EMANUEL RIGGI

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Argued May 12, 1958
Before KALODNER, STALEY and HASTIE, *Circuit Judges*

Opinion of the Court.

(Filed May 27, 1958.)

PER CURIAM.

Our review of the record discloses that there was ample evidence to sustain the jury's verdict.

We find no error in the trial court's charge to the jury. Further, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury in the language set forth by the defendant in his requests Nos. 18 and 19. The substance of the requested instructions was adequately embraced in the trial court's charge to the jury.

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
For the Third Circuit.

INDEX

	Page
Opinion below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Question presented	1
Statute involved	2
Statement	2
Argument	5
Conclusion	6

CITATIONS

Case:	
United States v. *Bayer*, 331 U.S. 532	6
Statute:	
18 U.S.C. 1951(a)	2

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1958

No. 115

EMANUEL RIGGI, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

---

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (R. 331; Pet. 12) is not yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on May 27, 1958 (R. 332). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on June 19, 1958. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the trial judge's instructions to the jury properly presented the issue raised by the petitioner's defense.

STATUTE INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. 1951(a):

> Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by * * * extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, * * * shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

STATEMENT

The petitioner seeks review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (R. 332) affirming the judgment of the District Court for the District of New Jersey adjudging petitioner guilty, upon the verdict of a jury, of violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951 by an attempt to extort money from an employer of labor, and by conspiracy so to do (R. 4). The petitioner was sentenced to two years' imprisonment on each offense, the sentences to run concurrently (R. 6).

The evidence for the government was to the effect that a construction company, in order to maintain labor peace, agreed with Doyle, business agent of the bricklayers' local, and the petitioner, business agent of the laborers' local, to carry fictitious workers on its payrolls, the funds to go to the business agents. Arrangements were first made between Smith, a representative of the construction company, and Doyle (R. 26-2 , 34-35, 38, 90). Thereafter, in the petitioner's presence, Doyle said that the petitioner wished the same arrangement (R. 32). When Smith said that he did not have final authority to make the arrangements, the petitioner told him he had better have Mr. Stewart

(Smith's superior) come if they "wanted to be sure of labor relations on the job." (R. 37).

Stewart made the arrangements in negotiations with Doyle (R. 138-139, 144-149, 153). Subsequently, when Stewart encountered the petitioner at a restaurant, the petitioner asked him if he was "all straight with Doyle," and when Stewart replied in the affirmative, the petitioner said "Well, that's fine. You can bring in anyone you care to." (R. 143-144).

Both Doyle and the petitioner testified that they had not made requests for fictitious payments (R. 237-240, 242, 244-245, 252-253, 276-278, 280-283).

The judge's charge at the close of testimony (R. 290-320), in addition to extensive general instructions, included the following:

> As far as Mr. Riggi is concerned, he contends that he had no part either in the conspiracy, or an attempt to extort; and moreover he has been acquitted by this Court of the charge of actual extortion. [R. 301] [1]
>
> * * * *
>
> * * * Before you can find that a conspiracy existed between Doyle and Riggi, it is your duty to determine from all the evidence if Riggi at any time had an understanding or agreement with Doyle and Murphy or either of them to

[1] In another count charging actual extortion, the judge granted a motion for acquittal on the ground of lack of evidence that a co-defendant Doyle turned over petitioner's share to petitioner (R. 220). Doyle was acquitted on the substantive count by the jury, but, like petitioner, was convicted on the attempt and conspiracy counts (R. 4). He did not appeal (Pet. 2). The third co-defendant, Murphy, pleaded guilty to all three counts (R. 2).

obtain moneys by putting the executives and employees of Chemsteel Corporation in fear that economic loss would result. If you find from all of the evidence that Emanuel Riggi did not have an understanding and an agreement to obtain for himself or another the moneys testified about, then it becomes your duty to find Emanuel Riggi not guilty. All of this evidence must be established by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt, and if you do not so find beyond a reasonable doubt, it becomes your duty to find Riggi not guilty. [R. 315]

The petitioner's requests to charge No. 18 and 19, at issue here, were as follows (R. 323-324):

18. If you find from all of the evidence that Emanuel Riggi had knowledge that Doyle and Murphy had entered into an understanding or agreement with the executives and employees of Chemsteel Corporation, this knowledge would not be sufficient to make him a conspirator. Knowledge of payments in reference to the fictitious bricklayers in and of itself is not sufficient to make him an aider and abettor or co-conspirator of Doyle and Murphy. Before you may find Emanuel Riggi guilty, it is essential that you be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Emanuel Riggi, in addition to the knowledge of the alleged arrangement, acted upon it and promoted the venture himself, make it his own and have a stake in its outcome. If you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt these factors, then Emanuel Riggi is not a conspirator, nor is he an aider and abettor in the conduct of Doyle and Murphy, and it is your duty, therefore, to find Emanuel Riggi not guilty.

19. There is evidence before you that a bricklayer requires, as part of his work, the aid and assistance of a common laborer. There is evidence before you that Doyle is the business agent of a Bricklayer's Union. There is likewise evidence before you that Emanuel Riggi is the business agent of what is commonly referred to as the Laborers' Union. The mere fact that Doyle and Riggi associated together, without more, is not evidence that their association was for a guilty purpose. You have no right to suspect that the mere conversation had between Doyle and Riggi were in and of themselves concerned for any illegal purpose. Their association and conversation, without more, is not proof of guilt. Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere meetings.

The judge refused so to charge except as Request No. 18 and the last two sentences of Request No. 19 were already embodied in the previous instructions (R. 315). The Court of Appeals affirmed, *per curiam*, stating that "the substance of the requested instructions was adequately embraced in the trial court's charge to the jury" (R. 331).

ARGUMENT

The trial judge acted well within the area of his discretion in refusing the proffered instructions except to the extent they had been covered in the charge already given. The instructions as given, though differing from those requested in emphasis and phraseology, clearly placed the factual issues in the proper legal setting before the jury.

As this Court said in *United States* v. *Bayer*, 331 U.S. 532, 536-537:

> * * * Once the judge has made an accurate and correct charge, the extent of its amplification must rest largely in his discretion. The trial judge, in the light of the whole trial and with the jury before him, may feel that to repeat the same words would make them no more clear, and to indulge in variations of statement might well confuse. How far any charge on technical questions of law is really understood by those of lay background would be difficult to ascertain, but it is certainly more evident in the living scene than in a cold record. * * *

CONCLUSION

The judgment below is a correct disposition of a particular factual problem upon established principles, and no conflict of decisions is involved. It is respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

J. LEE RANKIN,
Solicitor General.

MALCOLM ANDERSON,
Assistant Attorney General.

BEATRICE ROSENBERG,
J. F. BISHOP,
Attorneys:

JULY 1958.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1958 472671 40